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Abstract
Substantial improvements have been achieved in recent years in
voice conversion, which converts the speaker characteristics of
an utterance into those of another speaker without changing the
linguistic content of the utterance. Nonetheless, the improved
conversion technologies also led to concerns about privacy and
authentication. It thus becomes highly desired to be able to
prevent one’s voice from being improperly utilized with such
voice conversion technologies. This is why we report in this pa-
per the first known attempt to try to perform adversarial attack
on voice conversion. We introduce human imperceptible noise
into the utterances of a speaker whose voice is to be defended.
Given these adversarial examples, voice conversion models can-
not convert other utterances so as to sound like being produced
by the defended speaker. Preliminary experiments were con-
ducted on two currently state-of-the-art zero-shot voice conver-
sion models. Objective and subjective evaluation results in both
white-box and black-box scenarios are reported. It was shown
that the speaker characteristics of the converted utterances were
made obviously different from those of the defended speaker,
while the adversarial examples of the defended speaker are not
distinguishable from the authentic utterances.
Index Terms: voice conversion, adversarial attack, speaker ver-
ification, speaker representation
1. Introduction
Voice conversion aims to alter some specific acoustic character-
istics of an utterance, such as the speaker identity, while pre-
serving the linguistic content. These technologies were made
much more powerful by deep learning [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], but the
improved technologies also led to concerns about privacy and
authentication. One’s identity may be counterfeited by voice
conversion and exploited in improper ways, which is only one
of the many deepfake problems observed today generated by
deep learning, such as synthesized fake photos or fake voice.
Detecting any of such artifacts or defending against such activ-
ities is thus increasingly important [6, 7, 8, 9], which applies
equally to voice conversion.
On the other hand, it has been widely known that neural
networks are fragile in the presence of some specific noise, or
prone to yield different or incorrect results if the input is dis-
turbed by such subtle perturbations imperceptible to humans
[10]. Adversarial attack is to generate such subtle perturbations
that can fool the neural networks. It has been successful on
some discriminative models [11, 12, 13], but less reported on
generative models [14].
In this paper, we propose to perform adversarial attack
on voice conversion to prevent one’s speaker characteristics
from being improperly utilized with voice conversion. Human-
imperceptible perturbations are added to the utterances pro-
duced by the speaker to be defended. Three different ap-
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proaches, the end-to-end attack, embedding attack, and feed-
back attack are proposed, such that the speaker characteris-
tics of the converted utterances would be made very different
from those of the defended speaker. We conducted objective
and subjective evaluations on two recent state-of-the-art zero-
shot voice conversion models. Objective gender classification
showed the converted utterances were significantly different
from those produced by the defended speaker, which was then
verified by subjective similarity test. The effectiveness of the
proposed approaches was also verified for black-box attack via
a proxy model closer to the real application scenario.
2. Related works
2.1. Voice conversion
Traditionally, parallel data are required for voice conversion, or
the training utterances of the two speakers must be paired and
aligned. To overcome this problem, Chou et al. obtained disen-
tangled representations respectively for linguistic content and
speaker information with adversarial training [1]; CycleGAN-
VC used cycle-consistency to ensure the converted speech to
be linguistically meaningful with the target speaker’s features
[2]; and StarGAN-VC introduced conditional input for many-
to-many voice conversion [3]. All these are limited to speakers
seen in training.
Zero-shot approaches then tried to convert utterances to any
speaker given only one example utterance without fine-tuning,
and the target speaker is not necessarily seen before. Chou et
al. employed adaptive instance normalization for this purpose
[4]; AUTOVC integrated a pre-trained d-vector and an encoder
bottleneck, achieving the state-of-the-art results [5].
2.2. Attacking and defending voice
Automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems have been shown
to be prone to adversarial attacks. Applying perturbations
on the waveforms, spectrograms, or MFCC features was able
to make ASR systems fail to recognize the speech correctly
[15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Similar goals were achieved on speaker
recognition by generating adversarial examples to fool auto-
matic speaker verification (ASV) systems to predict that these
examples had been uttered by a specific speaker [20, 21, 22].
Different approaches for spoofing ASV were also proposed to
show the vulnerabilities of such systems [23, 24, 25]. But to
our knowledge, applying adversarial attacks on voice conver-
sion has not been reported yet.
On the other hand, many approaches were proposed to de-
fend one’s voice when ASV systems were shown to be vul-
nerable to spoofing attacks [26, 27, 28, 29]. In addition to
a challenge of ASVspoof for many years investigating such
spoofing techniques and countermeasures [30], Liu et al. con-
ducted adversarial attacks on those countermeasures, showing
the fragility of them [20]. Obviously all neural network models
are under the threat of adversarial attacks [11], which led to the
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Figure 1: The encoder-decoder based voice conversion model and the three proposed approaches. Perturbations are updated on the
utterances providing speaker characteristics, as the blue dashed lines indicate.
idea of attacking voice conversion models as proposed here.
3. Methodologies
A widely used model for voice conversion adopted an encoder-
decoder structure, in which the encoder is further divided into a
content encoder and a speaker encoder, as shown in Fig. 1. This
paper is also based on this model. The content encoder Ec ex-
tracts the content information from an input utterance t yielding
Ec(t), while the speaker encoder Es embeds the speaker char-
acteristics of an input utterance x as a latent vector Es(x), as
in the left part of Fig. 1. Taking Ec(t) and Es(x) as the input,
the decoderD generates a spectrogram F (t,x) with content in-
formation based on Ec(t) and speaker characteristics based on
Es(x).
Here we focus on the utterance x whose speaker is to be
defended, while do not care the utterance t offering the content,
since the content can be re-uttered by arbitrary speakers then
used in voice conversion. Motivated by the prior work [14],
here we present three approaches to perform the attack, with the
target being either the output spectrogram F (t,x) (Sec. 3.1), or
the speaker embedding Es(x) (Sec. 3.2), or the combination of
the two (Sec. 3.3), also shown in Fig. 1.
3.1. End-to-end attack
A straight-forward approach to perform adversarial attack on
the above model in Fig. 1 is to take the decoder output F (t,x)
as the target, referred to as end-to-end attack also shown in
Fig. 1. Denote the original spectrogram of an utterance pro-
duced by the speaker to be defended as x ∈ RM×T and the
adversarial perturbation on x as δ ∈ RM×T , where M and T
are the total number of frequency components and time frames
respectively. An untargeted attack simply aims to alter the out-
put of the voice conversion model and can be expressed as:
maximize
δ
L(F (t,x+ δ), F (t,x))
subject to ‖δ‖∞ < 
(1)
L(·, ·) is the distance between two vectors or the spectrograms
for two signals and  is a constraint making the perturbation
subtle. The signal t can be arbitrary offering the content of the
output utterance, on which we do not focus here.
Given a certain utterance y produced by a target speaker,
we can formulate a targeted attack for output signal with spe-
cific speaker characteristics:
minimize
δ
L(F (t,x+ δ), F (t,y))
− λL(F (t,x+ δ), F (t,x))
subject to ‖δ‖∞ < 
(2)
The first term in the first expression in (2) aims to make the
model output sound like being produced by the speaker of y,
while the second term is to eliminate the original speaker iden-
tity in x. λ is a positive valued hyperparameter balancing the
importance between source and target.
To effectively constrain the range of perturbation within
[−, ] while solving (2), we adopt the approach of Change of
variable as was done previously [31] using tanh(·) function. In
this way (2) above becomes (3) below:
minimize
w
L(F (t,x+ δ), F (t,y))
− λL(F (t,x+ δ), F (t,x))
subject to δ =  · tanh(w)
(3)
wherew ∈ RM×T . The clipping function is not needed here.
3.2. Embedding attack
The speaker encoder Es in Fig. 1 embeds an utterance into a
latent vector. These latent vectors for utterances produced by
the same speaker tend to cluster closely together, while those
by different speakers tend to be separated apart. The second
approach proposed here is focused on the speaker encoder by
directly changing the speaker embeddings of the utterances, re-
ferred to as embedding attack also in Fig. 1. As the decoder D
produces the output F (t,x) with speaker characteristics based
on the speaker embedding Es(x) as in Fig. 1, changing the
speaker embeddings therefore alters the output of the decoder.
Following the notations and expressions in (3), we have:
minimize
w
L(Es(x+ δ), Es(y))
− λL(Es(x+ δ), Es(x)))
subject to δ =  · tanh(w)
(4)
where the adversarial attack is now performed with the speaker
encoder Es only. Since only the speaker encoder is involved, it
is therefore more efficient.
3.3. Feedback attack
The third approach proposed here tries to combine the above
two approaches by feeding the output spectrogram F (t,x+ δ)
from the decoder D back to the speaker encoder Es (the red
feedback loop in Fig. 1), and consider the speaker embedding
obtained in this way. More specifically, Es(x + δ) in (4) is
replaced by Es(F (t,x + δ)) in (5). This is referred to as the
feedback attack also in Fig. 1.
minimize
w
L(Es(F (t,x+ δ)), Es(y))
− λL(Es(F (t,x+ δ)), Es(x)))
subject to δ =  · tanh(w)
(5)
4. Experimental settings
We conducted experiments on the model proposed by Chou
et al. [4] (referred to as Chou’s model below) and AUTOVC.
Both were able to perform zero-shot voice conversion on unseen
speakers given their few utterances without fine-tuning, consid-
ered suitable for our scenarios.
4.1. Speaker encoders
For Chou’s model, all modules were trained jointly from scratch
on CSTR VCTK Corpus [32]. The speaker encoder took a 512-
dim mel spectrogram and generated a 128-dim speaker embed-
ding. AUTOVC utilized pre-trained d-vector [33] as speaker
encoder, with 80-dim mel spectrogram as input and 256-dim
speaker embedding as output, pre-trained on VoxCeleb1 [34]
and LibriSpeech [35] but generalizable to unseen speakers.
4.2. Vocoders
In inference, Chou’s model leveraged Griffin-Lim algorithm
[36] to synthesize the audio. AUTOVC previously adopted
WaveNet [37] as the spectrogram inverter, but here we used
WaveRNN-based vocoder [38] pre-trained on VCTK corpus to
generate waveforms with similar quality due to time limitation.
As we introduced perturbation on spectrogram, vocoders
converting the spectrogram into waveform were necessary.
We respectively adopted Griffin-lim algorithm and WaveRNN-
based vocoder for attacks on Chou’s model and AUTOVC.
4.3. Attack procedure
We selected `2 norm asL(·, ·), and λ = 0.1 for all experiments.
Adam optimizer was adopted to update perturbations iteratively
within a fixed number of iterations.
In white-box scenario, publicly available parameters were
used. For black-box scenario, we trained another model with
the same structure but different initialization. Attacks were per-
formed on these newly trained models, while evaluated on pub-
licly available ones. So all evaluation results were obtained with
publicly available models.
5. Results
5.1. Objective tests
Although an intuitive assessment of the results here is speaker
classification or verification over the converted utterances, we
adopted gender classification accuracy as a more reliable and
stronger metric, and the machine can estimate it more accu-
rately. This is because if the gender was estimated by machine
as different from the defended speaker, the speaker character-
istics are definitely seriously altered, or the voice was well de-
fended. The gender classification model used consisted of a
pre-trained d-vector plus two fully-connected layers, with the
last layer producing the gender prediction. It was trained on
VCTK corpus, achieving over 99% accuracy on the validation
set. We created 100 adversarial examples (x+δ in (3), (4), (5))
for 50 male and 50 female randomly selected speakers in VCTK
corpus, targeting speakers with gender opposite to the defended
speaker, and performed gender classification respectively on
these adversarial example utterances (referred to as adversar-
ial input), the converted utterances F (t,x + δ) (referred to
as adversarial output), and the converted authentic utterances
F (t,x) as well (referred to as original output). The same ex-
amples were used in each test for Chou’s and AUTOVC.
Table 1 lists the gender classification accuracy for the de-
fended speaker under white-box scenario. Results for the three
approaches mentioned in Sec. 3 are in the three columns (i) (ii)
(iii). Section (I) is for Chou’s model with rows (a) (b) respec-
tively for adversarial input and adversarial output, while row
(c) for original output. Similarly in section (II) for AUTOVC.
We can see the adversarial inputs sounded very close to the de-
fended speaker or the perturbation δ almost imperceptible (rows
(a) (d) close to 1.00), while the converted utterances sounded as
from an opposite gender (rows (b) (e) much lower). All the three
approaches were effective (rows (a) (b) (d) (e)), although end-
to-end attack worked very well for Chou’s (row (b) and column
(i)), while embedding attack worked very well for both Chou’s
and AUTOVC with respective to both adversarial input and out-
put (rows (a) (b) (d) (e) and column (ii)).
Table 1: Gender classification accuracy for the defended
speaker with (I) Chou’s ( = 0.1) and (II) AUTOVC ( = 0.05)
by the three proposed approaches under the white-box scenario.
Utterances
Methodologies (white-box)
(i) (ii) (iii)
end-to-end embedding feedback
(I)
C
ho
u’
s (a) adversarial input 0.84 0.94 0.93
(b) adversarial output 0.28 0.36 0.35
(c) original output 1.00 1.00 1.00
(II)
A
U
T
O
V
C (d) adversarial input 1.00 0.97 1.00
(e) adversarial output 0.77 0.60 0.82
(f) original output 0.88 0.88 0.88
For black-box scenario, we analyzed the same gender clas-
sification accuracy as in Table 1 for Chou’s model only but with
varying scale of the perturbations , with results plotted in Fig. 2
(a) (b) (c) respectively for the three approaches proposed. We
see when  = 0.1 the adversarial inputs were kept almost intact
(blue curves close to 1.0) while adversarial outputs were seri-
ously disturbed (red curves much lower). However, as  ≥ 0.2
the speaker characteristics of the adversarial inputs were altered
drastically (blue curves went down), although the adversarial
outputs sounded very different (red curves went very low).
Fig. 3 shows the same results as in Fig. 2 except on AU-
TOVC with embedding attack only (as the other two methods
did not work well in white-box scenario in Table 1 row (e)). We
see very similar results and the embedding attack could success-
fully attack AUTOVC.
Among the three proposed approaches, the embedding at-
tack turned out to be the most attractive, considering both de-
fending effectiveness and time efficiency. The feedback attack
offered performance comparable to the embedding attack on
Chou’s model, but less effective on AUTOVC. It also took more
time to apply the perturbation as one more complete encoder-
to-decoder inference was required. The end-to-end attack was
less attractive in Table 1 (lower in row (a) and column (i) for
Chou’s and higher in row (e) and column (i) for AUTOVC),
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Figure 2: The gender classification accuracy for different perturbation  on Chou’s model under black-box scenario for the three
proposed approaches: (a) end-to-end attack, (b) embedding attack, and (c) feedback attack.
probably because the distance between spectrograms used here
was not always parallel to the distance between speaker gender
characteristics. The speaker embeddings used in the two other
approaches (columns (ii) (iii)) worked better in this sense.
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Figure 3: Same as Fig. 2 except on AUTOVC and for embed-
ding attack only.
5.2. Subjective tests
The above gender classification was objective but not necessar-
ily adequate. So we performed subjective evaluation but with
the most attractive embedding attack on AUTOVC only for both
white- and black-box scenarios. We manually selected 50 ex-
amples successfully converted by AUTOVC1 additionally. The
corresponding adversarial inputs and outputs and the original
outputs as used above were then created for each of these ex-
amples for  = 0.075. The subjects were then asked if the
two given utterances were from the same speaker: one is the
original utterance, whereas the other is the adversarial input,
adversarial output, or original output. Each pair of utterances
was evaluated by 5 subjects, and the results are bars (a) (b) for
white-box, (c) (d) for black-box scenarios, and (e) for origi-
nal output in Fig. 4. We can see at least 44% - 58% of the
adversarial inputs preserved the original speaker characteris-
tics very well (red in bars (a) (c)), yet at least 58% - 88% of
the adversarial outputs were obviously considered from a dif-
ferent speaker (blue in bars (b) (d)). The black-box scenario
is more difficult than the white-box one, but the approach is
1We only evaluated the examples that can be successfully converted
by the voice conversion model because if an example cannot be suc-
cessfully converted, then there is no need to defend it.
still effective to a good extent. The demo can be found at
https://yistlin.github.io/attack-vc-demo.
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Figure 4: Subjective evaluation by speaker similarity with em-
bedding attack on AUTOVC.
6. Conclusions
Improved voice conversion techniques imply higher demand
for new technologies to defend personal speaker characteristics.
This paper presents the first known attempt to try to perform ad-
versarial attack on voice conversion. Three different approaches
are proposed and tested on two state-of-the-art voice conversion
models in both objective and subjective evaluation with very en-
couraging results, including for the black-box scenario closer to
real applications.
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